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1 Introduction
More than 50 years ago Marschak and Andrews (1944) showed that production function
regressions generate inconsistent parameter estimates because optimal supply and factor
inputs are jointly determined by unobservable diﬀerences in eﬃciency across firms. The
problem with regressions on firm level data has haunted studies of eﬃciency and producer
behavior ever since; see Griliches and Mairesse (1998) for a survey. In this paper, we
propose an econometric model that explicitly uses the full system of equations derived
from optimizing supply and factor demands to overcome this problem. The econometric
model allows us to explore the origins of the eﬃciency diﬀerences across firms.
Eﬃciency diﬀerences are decomposed into stochastic, firm-specific (idiosyncratic) cu-
mulated innovations as emphasized e.g. by Ericson and Pakes (1995), and permanent
eﬃciency diﬀerences as emphasized by Jovanovic (1982) and others1. In the six high-tech
industries that we examine, the eﬃciency diﬀerences are largely permanent. Cumulated
innovations in eﬃciency play a lesser role among the firms established within our 24 year
period.
A large literature on firm heterogeneity has focused on firm performance as measured
by size (sales or employment), including Pakes and Ericson (1998). However, most recent
studies of diﬀerences in firm performance have focused on diﬀerences in eﬃciency. In
competitive environments, diﬀerences in size and eﬃciency should be closely related as
more eﬃcient firms will tend to be larger, see e.g. Demsetz (1973), Lucas (1978), and
Jovanovic (1982). Our structural model highlights the positive relationship between size
and eﬃciency, while also emphasizing that the fixity of capital is essential in explaining
diﬀerences in firm sizes.
We use the term eﬃciency rather than productivity, as our structural model suggests
that diﬀerences in labor productivity are unrelated to diﬀerences in eﬃciency. The ar-
gument is simple, but seems to have been overlooked in the literature: Consider firms
with diﬀerent levels of eﬃciency competing in a frictionless industry. A firm with high
eﬃciency will choose a high level of labor input so that its marginal product is equal to
the real wage, which, by assumption, is the same across all firms2. With a Cobb-Douglas
1Appendix A gives a survey of theoretical models focusing on firm heterogeneity.
2We assume diminishing returns for profit-maximization to be well defined.
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production function, the marginal product is proportional to production per factor in-
put, and, hence, all firms should have the same level of production per factor input apart
from transient noise or fluctuations3. This argument raises the question of how to make
inferences about diﬀerences in eﬃciency from firm level data, which is a central theme in
our analysis.
Our econometric framework uses a state space-approach, in combination with the
Kalman filter and smoother, to decompose the observations of firm-level supply and factor
demands in terms of four types of latent components: (i) firm-specific permanent com-
ponents, (ii) firm-specific stochastic trends, (iii) transient noise, and (iv) industry-wide
fluctuations. The multivariate framework imposes few restrictions on the data generat-
ing process a priori and allows us to consider the validity of the restrictions imposed by
our structural model. Our testing procedure relates to co-integrated time-series analysis.
Our structural model of firm behavior implies that supply and factor inputs should be
co-integrated with a heavily constrained co-integrating vector, and we show that these
constraints are largely satisfied in all industries. The model is estimated by a partial like-
lihood function and we discuss the question of identification emphasizing sample attrition
and the fact that we do not explicitly model the firms’ exit decisions.
2 A first look at diﬀerences in firm performance
How should we measure diﬀerences in firm performance and do these diﬀerences increase
with firm age? Using size as a preliminary measure of firm performance, we address the
second question in Figure 14. Figure 1 presents the means and standard deviations of log
sales as a function of firm age. All observations are measured relative to industry-year
means. Not surprisingly, the graph shows that on average young firms are substantially
smaller than older firms and that firm growth tends to decelerate with age. More inter-
estingly, the graph shows that relative diﬀerences in firm size are almost independent of
firm age.
Figure 2 shows that the relative diﬀerences in firm size are highly persistent as the firms
3Also in the CES case, there is a one-to-one relation between marginal product and production per
factor input.
4Figures 1-2 are based on a comprehensive, unbalanced sample of firm level observations from six (two-
digit NACE) high-tech manufacturing industries, as discussed in Section 5. Graphs for the six separate
industries show the same patterns as in Figures 1-3.
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become older. That is, the upper graph in Figure 2 displays the correlation coeﬃcient
between log sales in the firms’ first year and in their subsequent years. The correlation
coeﬃcient for the first and the second year is 0.94, and it declines slowly in the subsequent
years.
These patterns indicate that diﬀerences across young firms are as large as those among
older firms and the diﬀerences are highly persistent, suggesting that firm heterogeneity is
generated by permanent diﬀerences. However, this conclusion is preliminary as it leaves
open a number of questions. Young firms have a high rate of exit; on average, 50 percent
of a new cohort of firms have exited within seven years in our sample. Since exiting firms
are systematically selected among the least successful firms, we expect an upward trend in
average log sales. Such an upward trend is clearly seen in Figure 1. Systematic selection
that eliminates the least successful firms should also, cet.par., tend to narrow down the
diﬀerences in firm size. However, such narrowing is not visible in the figure. There
must be an oﬀsetting force that tends to make firms grow more unequal with age. Such
an oﬀsetting force could be idiosyncratic, cumulated shocks that would also explain the
declining correlation between a firm’s performance in its first year and in its subsequent
years, demonstrated in Figure 2.
Labor productivity is another widely used measure of firm performance. Figure 3
presents means and standard deviations of labor productivity as a function of firm age.
We see that the patterns are rather diﬀerent from those in Figure 1. There is no upward
trend in labor productivity and the standard deviations decline substantially with age.
The diﬀerence between sales and labor productivity is equally striking when we turn to
Figure 2. The lower graph in Figure 2 displays the correlation coeﬃcient between labor
productivity in the firms’ first year and in their subsequent years5. The low correlation
coeﬃcient between productivity in the first two years shows that almost half of the ob-
served variance in labor productivity is due to temporary fluctuations or noise in the data.
A comparison of the two graphs in Figure 2 raises the question of why diﬀerences in size
are considerably more persistent than diﬀerences in labor productivity. This comparison
indicates that labor productivity is a rather noisy measure of eﬃciency, as we will discuss
5Figures 1-3 focus on heterogeneity in new cohorts of firms. Similar patterns of heterogeneity and
autocorrelation are also present among older and larger firms. E.g. high and low degrees of persistence
in diﬀerences in revenues and labor productivity, respectively, are not restricted to the firms’ early years.
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further below.
3 A structural model of optimal supply and factor
demand
Our preliminary look at the data suggests that we need an econometric framework that
can address a number of challenging methodological issues. The framework must account
for the permanent diﬀerences embedded in firms at birth and how the diﬀerences evolve
over time. In addition, it must account for the considerable noise in the data, and self-
selection, yet it should be flexible enough to enable us to examine alternative measures
of firm performance.
Section 3.1 presents a simple model of optimal supply and factor demand. This model
is the basis for our econometric framework that we use to make inferences about unob-
served diﬀerences in eﬃciency from observations of supply and factor demand, as explained
in Section 3.2.
3.1 Optimal supply and factor demand
Consider the production function
Qit = AitK
γ
i,t−1 F (Mit, Lit) , (1)
where Qit and Ait denote firm i’s output and eﬃciency in year t, Ki,t−1 is the predeter-
mined capital stock, and F (Mit, Lit) is a function aggregating materials and labor inputs.
F (Mit, Lit) is homogenous of degree ε (ε < 1). Given common prices across firms for
output, labor and materials, Pt =

pt, w
l
t, w
m
t

, it follows that the short-run cost-function
has the following form:
C(Pt, Qit, Ait,Ki,t−1) = G(Pt)

Qit
AitK
γ
i,t−1
1/ε
. (2)
Setting price equal to marginal costs, we obtain the following set of supply and (short-run)
factor demand equations:


lnQit
lnMit
lnLit

 =


(1− ε)−1
(1− ε)−1
(1− ε)−1

 lnAit +


γ (1− ε)−1
γ (1− ε)−1
γ (1− ε)−1

 lnKi,t−1 + g(Pt), (3)
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where g(Pt) is a vector function common across firms that depends (only) on the common
price vector. Its functional form reflects the properties of the production function (1).
According to (3), diﬀerences in firm output, material use and labor input are infor-
mative about unobserved diﬀerences in firm eﬃciency, conditional on the firms’ capital
stocks. The equations in (3) cannot be directly exploited to make inferences about the
diﬀerences in eﬃciency, as these tend to be (positively) correlated with diﬀerences in
capital. Hence, to obtain an econometric model that allows us to make inferences about
diﬀerences in eﬃciency, we must introduce a model of capital accumulation.
Capital stock dynamics: Consider now the capital stock dynamics derived from each
firm’s optimal investment behavior. Let Iit denote the resources required to change the
firm’s capital stock from Ki,t−1 at the end of period t− 1 to Kit at the end of period t,
while qt denotes the price per unit Iit.
Provided (Ait, P t) is Markovian, where P t = (Pt, qt), the firm’s investment problem is
the solution of the Bellman equation:
V (Ait, Ki,t−1, P
t) = max
Kit
{Π(Ait, Ki,t−1, Pt)− qt Iit
+ β E[V (Ai,t+1,Kit, P t+1)|Ωit]

, (4)
where V (Ait,Ki,t−1, P t) is the value function and
Π(Ait, Ki,t−1, Pt) = π(Pt) (AitKγi,t−1)
1/(1−ε) (5)
is the short-run profit function. In equations (4) and (5), β is the discount factor, E [·|Ωit]
is the expectation conditional on the firm’s information at t, and π(Pt) is a function of
input and output prices. We assume convex adjustment costs such that
Kit = Ki,t−1

1− δ + δ1−α (Iit/Ki,t−1)α

, α ∈ (0, 1). (6)
Small α corresponds to large adjustment costs, while α = 1 gives the standard equation
for capital accumulation without adjustment costs. Appendix C shows that with constant
returns to scale, i.e. γ+ ε = 1, and Ki,t−1 * Kit, an optimal capital accumulation policy
satisfies:
lnKit = lnKi,t−1 +
δα
1− α

ln v(Ait, P
t) + ln(
αβ
qt
)

, (7)
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where v(Ait, P t) is the expected value per unit of capital in period t + 1, conditional on
the firm’s information Ωit.
The function v(Ait, P t) is increasing in Ait. Moreover, as discussed in Appendix C,
v(Ait, P
t) is approximately homogenous of degree (1− ε)−1 in Ait. Hence, we can approx-
imate (7) by
lnKit = κk lnKi,t−1 + κa lnAit + κt, (8)
where κa = δα(1−α)(1−ε) and κt is an industry-wide time varying intercept. According to
(7), κk = 1, but with decreasing returns to scale, the optimal investment behavior implies
that d lnKit
d lnKi,t−1
< 1. Thus, we have in (8) included a parameter κκ, which is less than one
if there are decreasing returns to scale6.
Supply and factor demand: Combining (3) and (8), we obtain a simultaneous system
of equations:
yit = θa lnAi1 + θa ln (Ait/Ai1) + θk ln (Ki,t−1) + θt, (9)
where
yit ≡

lnQit lnMit lnLit lnKit

θa =

1
1−ε ,
1
1−ε ,
1
1−ε , κa

θk =
 γ
1−ε ,
γ
1−ε ,
γ
1−ε , κk

(10)
while θt =

g(Pt)
, κt

.
The model (9)-(10) suggests that diﬀerences between firms in the endogenous variables
yit are due to diﬀerences in eﬃciency ln (Ait) and capital accumulation, ln (Ki,t−1). Capital
accumulation, according to (7), is driven by cumulated changes in eﬃciency and changes
in input and output prices. Equation (9) decomposes diﬀerences in eﬃciency into two
components: permanent diﬀerences already introduced when the firms are established,
lnAi1, and diﬀerences in subsequent innovations, i.e. the cumulated changes in eﬃciency,
ln (Ait/Ai1).
6However, in that case κk cannot be given a direct interpretation in terms of the elasticity of scale.
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Eﬃciency, profitability and labor productivity: Before we complete our econo-
metric model by specifying its stochastic properties, we discuss how our model relates dif-
ferences in eﬃciency to profitability and labor productivity. According to (5), (short-run)
profitability is increasing in eﬃciency Ait and capital Ki,t−1. On the other hand, (3) shows
that diﬀerences in labor productivity, i.e. value added per labor input (Qit −Mit) /Lit,
are independent of diﬀerences in firm eﬃciency, Ait. This result shows that diﬀerences in
eﬃciency and capital intensity is inadequate to explain diﬀerences in labor productivity.
The relationship between various measures of size and eﬃciency on the one hand and the
absence of a similar relationship between labor productivity and eﬃciency on the other,
may explain why diﬀerences in sales are much more persistent than the diﬀerences in labor
productivity, as we saw in Figure 2. We will elaborate on this theme in the concluding
Section 9.
3.2 The econometric model
The model of firm behavior, (9)-(10), is highly constraining on the data as it assumes
that eﬃciency changes aﬀect all the components of yit through a single latent variable,
Ait, and, furthermore, that the three first components of the ”loading vector” θa are
equal. Notice, however, that θa (and consequently γ) are not identified, because Ait is
not observed (by the econometrician).
In this section we formulate a more general econometric model that encompasses the
structural model. This general econometric model imposes considerably less structure on
the data generating process than (9)-(10), and allows us to test the empirical validity of
the structural restrictions. Our general model is:
yit = vi + ait + θk lnKi,t−1 + dt + eit, τ i ≤ t ≤ T, (11)
where
ait =

04 t = τ i
ai,t−1 + ηit t = τ i + 1, ..., T,
(12)
0k denotes the k-dimensional vector of zeros, and vi,ηit and eit are 4-dimensional vectors
that have independent, multivariate normal distributions:
vi ∼ IN (04,Σv), ηit ∼ IN (04,Ση), eit ∼ IN (04,Σe). (13)
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We have an unbalanced panel data set, where firm i is observed from year τ i ≥ 1 until
Ti ≤ T , where τ i is the date of the firm’s birth. The birth dates τ i have an exogenous
distribution, while the exit dates Ti can be endogenous, as we discuss in Section 6.2.
When interpreting equation (11) in view of the structural equation (9), the term ait
corresponds to θa ln (Ait/Ai1), vi corresponds to θa ln (Ai1), while all transient shocks and
measurement errors are captured by eit. While it may seem restrictive to assume that
ait is a random walk, our econometric procedure does not critically depend on moderate
departures from the random walk assumption, as discussed in Appendix B. For example,
our main results presented in Section 7 would not be seriously aﬀected if the ait process
was slightly mean reverting, as suggested by Blundell and Bond (1999, 2000).
The magnitude of the covariance matrices are essential for the interpretation and iden-
tification of the model (11)-(13). The model encompasses some well-known econometric
models of firm heterogeneity as special cases: If Ση = 04×4 , we obtain the fixed eﬀect
model widely used to account for firm heterogeneity in the econometric panel data liter-
ature (0k×k denotes the k× k matrix of zeros). When Σe = 04×4, the model is consistent
with Gibrat’s law discussed by Sutton (1997), where firm growth from period t − 1 to t
is independent of the level in period t − 1. On the other hand, when Σe is a non-zero
matrix, the model (11)-(13) implies ”mean reversion”, in the sense that any component
of ∆yit will be negatively correlated with the corresponding component of yit−17.
Are the parameters of the covariance matrices identified? Consider a sample covering
two years; t = 1, 2. From (11)-(13), ignoring capital for simplicity, we have:
Cov (yit,yis) =

Σv +Ση [min (t, s)− 1] t 9= s
Σv +Ση(t− 1) +Σe t = s.
(14)
We then obtain: Cov(yi2,yi1) = Σv, Cov(yi1,yi1) = Σv +Σe, and Cov(yi2,yi2) = Σv +
Ση +Σe. Although identification of the covariance matrices thus appears almost trivial,
the situation is complicated by sample attrition, as discussed in Section 6.2.
Testing the structural model: As mentioned, there are no a priori constraints (apart
from positive semi-definiteness) on the covariance matrices Σv and Ση in our general
7Friedman (1993) has emphasized that noise and temporary fluctuations in the data often mislead
researchers to infer convergence across the units of observations when there is no convergence in the
underlying, uncontaminated processes of interest. See also Quah (1993).
10
econometric model (11)-(13). On the other hand, according to the structural model (9)-
(10) these two matrices can be factorized as:
Σv = θaθa V ar (lnAi1)
Ση = θaθa V ar [ln (Ait/Ai1)] . (15)
If (15) holds, the rank of Ση is 1, and all components of ηit are determined by a single
latent factor, say ηit:
ηit = uηηit, with ηit ∼ IN (0, σ2η), (16)
where uη is the eigenvector of Ση corresponding to the only non-zero eigenvalue σ2η . The
eigenvector is normalized so that nuηn = 1. From (12) and (16):
ait = uηait, where ait =
[
s≤t
ηis. (17)
Similarly, vi can be expressed by a single latent factor vi:
vi = uvvi, with vi ∼ IN (0,σ2v), (18)
where uv is the (normalized) eigenvector of Σv, corresponding to the only non-zero eigen-
value σ2v.
According to (15) the (normalized) eigenvectors uv and uη should be identical:
uv = uη =
θa
nθan
, (19)
which is a testable restriction. From the definition of θa in (13), a further testable impli-
cation of the structural model is that the first three components within each eigenvector
are equal.
Preceding a test of the structure of uη and uv, we must examine a more basic question:
How well does a model with only one latent component - i.e. where the rank of Σv and
Ση is one - fit the data compared with a model with no structural constraints on Σv and
Ση? Consider a Ση-matrix with rank r ≤ 4. The innovations ηit can then be represented
through an orthogonal factor decomposition (see Anderson, 1984):
ηit = uη,(1)ηit,(1) + ...+ uη,(r)ηit,(r), (20)
where uη,(j) is the normalized eigenvector ofΣη corresponding to its j’th largest eigenvalue
σ2η,(j). Furthermore, ηit,(j) ∼ IN (0,σ2η,(j)). According to our structural model, r = 1, so
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that only the first eigenvalue is non-zero. That is, σ2η,(1) > 0 and σ
2
η,(j) = 0 for j ≥
2. Hence, if our structural model is valid, the largest eigenvalue eσ2η,(1) of the estimated
covariance matrix eΣη should be large relative to the others. A similar result should hold
with regard to the magnitude of the estimated eigenvalues eσ2v,(j) of Σv.
Our testing procedure can be related to time series analysis and terminology. Our
structural model imposes a cointegration relationship between the components of yit,
with an a priori highly constrained cointegration vector: a linear combination λyit will
be a stationary variable (relative to the industry-wide trend dt) if λθa = 0 .
4 Why do firms diﬀer in eﬃciency?
Given the validity of our structural model, we can address questions of why firms diﬀer. I
particular, our econometric framework allows us to decompose diﬀerences in eﬃciency and
to quantify the relative importance of permanent diﬀerences and cumulated innovations.
A natural measure of the importance of permanent diﬀerences relative to idiosyncratic
innovations in a particular year, say T , is
V ≡ V ar {lnAi1}
V ar {ln (AiT/Ai1)} .
Note that V is identified even if lnAit is not: From (17) and (18) it follows that
V =
V ar {vi}
V ar {aiT} =
σ2v
T¯ σ2η
, (21)
where σ2v and σ2η are the (non-zero) eigenvalues of Σv and Ση, respectively, and T¯ ≡
E{T − τ i}, i.e. the average life-time of firms operating in year T .
The measure V, defined in (21), ignores endogenous exit, which will tend to reduce
the variances both in vi and aiT among the firms operating in year T . Hence, we focus on
a modified version of (21): Let MT be the set of firms that operate in year T . We define
the conditional variance ratio, CV , as
CV =
V ar {vi|i ∈MT}
V ar {aiT | i ∈MT} . (22)
As we shall see in Section 6, CV is computed from the distribution of the latent
components vi and aiT conditional on the observations (yi,τ i , ....,yi,T ). Thus, while V is
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computed from the unconditional distribution of the latent variables, CV is calculated
from their conditional distribution given the observed data. This implies that CV is
considerably less sensitive to the a priori assumption of a random walk process for ait,
as it is essentially a semi-parametric measure. We will return to this issue in Section
6.3, where we also elaborate upon our discussion of the self-selection problem and other
econometric issues.
5 Data and variable construction
We rely on raw data from Statistics Norway’s Annual Manufacturing Census, which pro-
vide annual observations on sales, intermediates, wage costs, gross investment and other
variables for all Norwegian manufacturing establishments for the period 1973-1996. The
Census is comprehensive in the sense that a firm is included as soon as it starts to pay
payroll taxes. Separate estimates are presented for six diﬀerent industry groups corre-
sponding to the 2-digit NACE codes; see Appendix D.
Following Caves’ (1998) survey of empirical findings on firm growth and turnover,
we have not stressed the distinction between a firm and an establishment8. The unit
of observation in our data is an establishment in a given year. For convenience, we
have labeled the unit a firm rather than an establishment, which is not misleading in a
large majority of cases, since only 10-20 percent of the establishments belong to multi-
establishment firms in the sectors we consider9.
All costs and revenues are measured in nominal prices, and incorporate taxes and
subsidies. We have not deflated the variables with the available industry wide deflators as
the econometric model contains an industry wide time varying intercept vector. The model
contains four variables, which are measured on log-scale: sales, labor costs, materials, and
capital. Sales are adjusted for inventory changes. Labor costs incorporate salaries and
wages in cash and kind, social security and other costs incurred by the employer. The
capital variable is constructed on the basis of annual fire insurance values and gross
8Caves (1998) points out that most of the results on firm growth and turnover have been insensitive
to the establishment-firm distinction.
9This is not to deny that the distinction between firms (or lines-of-business) and establishments raises
interesting questions for our analysis. For instance, are there strong correlations between eﬃciency levels
across establishments within a firm? Do new establishments from an existing firm have the same eﬃciency
as new firms? We will investigate these and related questions in future research.
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investment (including repairs).
Initially all firms in a sector that were operating during 1973-96 were included in
the sample, and observed until T = 1996. For the firms established before 1973 we
introduced separate (nuisance) parameters for the distribution of vi10, since vi for these
firms is composed of both permanent diﬀerences and cumulated innovations (up until
1973) and therefore has a diﬀerent meaning than for firms established after 1972. For
this reason, firms entering the industry before 1973 are excluded from the analysis of firm
heterogeneity. Of all plants operating in 1996, 75-85 percent were established after 1972,
and thus are included in the analysis of firm heterogeneity. These firms account for a
similar share of total sales in 1996.
Some ”cleaning” of the data was performed. A firm was excluded from the sample if:
(i) the value of an endogenous variable is missing for two or more subsequent years; (ii)
the firm disappears from the raw data file and then reappears; or (iii) the firm is observed
in a single year only. These trimming procedures reduced the data set by 15-20 percent.
In addition we removed firms with extreme variations in the endogenous variables, which
eliminated an additional 4-8 percent of the observations11. Some summary statistics are
presented in Table 1.
6 Econometric issues
Our econometric model, presented in Section 3, raises a set of econometric issues that we
address in this section. These include: (i) estimation of the structural parameters of the
model, (ii) consistency of the parameter estimates in the presence of self-selection, and
(iii) calculation of the conditional variance ratio CV for the latent variables. Parts of the
discussion are quite technical and some readers may initially wish to proceed to the next
section presenting the empirical results.
6.1 Estimation
The main challenge in estimating our econometric model (11) is to obtain a computation-
ally convenient representation of the log-likelihood function and its derivatives. Having
10That is, vi ∼ N (hµv, hΣv)
11Extreme variation means that the diﬀerenced variables (on log-scale) have a maximum absolute value
that is more than four standard deviations away from the (sector specific) mean maximum absolute values.
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achieved that, an eﬃcient quasi-Newton algorithm can be applied to maximize the likeli-
hood function with respect to the unknown parameters β = (Ση,Σv,Σe,θk,d) (d denotes
the matrix of time-dummies). A state space representation of the model, combined with
a decomposition of the log-likelihood function well known from the EM (Expectation
Maximization) algorithm, provides an eﬃcient solution to our estimation problem.
The state space representation: In order to obtain a state space representation that
is useful for estimation purposes, we start by factorizing the covariance matrices Ση and
Σv, assuming that these have arbitrary rank r (r ≤ 4):
Ση = ΓηΓη (23)
Σv = ΓvΓv. (24)
Equations (23)-(24) are rank-r decompositions of the two covariance matrices Ση and Σv,
where Γη and Γv are 4 × r lower triangular matrices (i.e. with zeros above the main
diagonal). The matrix factors Γη and Γv are uniquely determined, given positivity of the
diagonal elements.
With Γη and Γv defined in (23)-(24), equations (11)-(13) can be restated on the
following state space form:
yit = Gαit + dt + θk lnKi,t−1 + eit
αit = Fitαi,t−1 + ωit
t = τ i, ..., Ti, (25)
where the state vector αit has dimension 2r, and is determined by the equations:
αi,τ i−1 = 02r
G =

Γη Γv

Fit =

02r×2r t = τ i
I2r t = τ i + 1, ..., Ti
ωit ∼



IN

0r
0r

,

0r×r 0r×r
0r×r Ir

t = τ i
IN

0r
0r

,

Ir 0r×r
0r×r 0r×r

t = τ i + 1, ..., Ti.
(26)
Notice that Gαit = ait+ vi, since the first r components of αit are the orthogonal latent
factors of ait, normalized to have unit variance, while the last r components of αit are
the normalized latent factors of vi.
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The likelihood function and its derivatives: Given the state space representation
(25)-(26), it is well known that the log-likelihood function can be evaluated for any given
parameter value β by using the Kalman filter and smoother (see e.g. Harvey (1989)).
Let yi,→t = (yi,τ i , ...,yit). Then
L(β) = −1
2
N[
i=1
Ti[
t=τ i

ln
GVit |t−1G +Σe
+Rit 

GVit |t−1G
 +Σe
−1
Rit

where
Vit |t−1 = E{(αit − ait|t−1)(αis − ait−1|Ti−τ i+1) |yi,→t−1}
ait|t−1 = E{αit |yi,→t−1}
Rit = yit −Gait|t−1 − dt − θk lnKi,t−1.
(27)
Appendix E explains in detail how the Kalman filter and smoother can be applied to the
state space form (25) to evaluate the conditional moments in (27) at the parameter value
β.
While the evaluation of the likelihood function is straightforward, the main challenge
is to obtain analytic expressions for the derivatives of L(β). The task of obtaining an
analytic form for ∂L(β)∂β may seem prohibitive since L(β) indirectly depends on β through
the Kalman filter recursions12.
Our solution to the problem is to make a somewhat unusual application of techniques
associated with the EM (Expectation Maximization) algorithm — an algorithm originally
developed by Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977), and refined by Meng and Rubin (1993),
and others.
Let f(y,α;β) be the joint density of the observed variables y = {yit} and the latent
variables α = {αit}. Furthermore, let f(α|y;β) be the conditional density of α, given y.
The maximum likelihood estimator, eβ, is the maximum of the log-likelihood L(β), where
L(β) = ln f(y;β). (28)
Since
f(y;β) = f(y,α;β)
f(α|y;β) ,
(28) can be rewritten as
L(β) = ln f(y,α;β)− ln f(α|y;β). (29)
12In principle one could find the derivatives recursively by applying the chain rule to each iterations
of the Kalman filter. However, the programming task would be enormous, and even if one were able to
obtain the derivatives through a herculean eﬀort, repeated use of the chain rule would magnify round oﬀ
error due to numerous matrix multiplications and lead to imprecise calculations.
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Taking the expectation of both sides in (29) with respect to f(α|y;β), where β is an
arbitrary parameter value, gives:
L(β) =M(β|β)−H(β|β), (30)
where
M(β|β) =
]
ln f(y,α;β) f(α|y;β) dα
H(β|β) =
]
ln f(α|y;β) f(α|y;β) dα.
While the decomposition (30) is not useful in calculating L(β), it has the following ex-
tremely important property:
∂L(β)
∂β

β=β
=
∂M(β|β)
∂β

β=β
, (31)
which follows from the fact that β is the maximizer ofH(β|β) (by Kullback’s inequality),
and hence a stationary point. As shown in Appendix E, the derivatives ∂L(β
)
∂β can easily
be obtained by analytic diﬀerentiation of M(β|β). Furthermore, the Hessian of L(β) at
the ML estimate eβ can be obtained by numerical diﬀerentiation of ∂M(β|eβ)∂β

β=eβ
, yielding
a computationally simple estimator of the covariance matrix of eβ.
6.2 Identification, attrition and consistent estimation
Discussing identification of the model (11)-(13) in Section 3.2, we noticed that the question
is complicated by entry, and, in particular, sample attrition. We can exploit the results
of Cox (1975) and Little and Rubin (1987), which show that a pseudo likelihood function
— that is, the likelihood obtained by treating the exit times Ti as if they were fixed
indices — yields consistent estimators in the presence of systematic selection, provided the
stochastic process, yit, satisfies the so-called missing at random (MAR) condition13. The
MAR condition needed in our case is (assuming τ i = 1 for all firms):
f(yit|χit,yi1, ..,yi,t−1;β) = f(yit|yi1, ..,yi,t−1;β), t = 1, ..., T and i = 1, ..,N, (32)
where f(·|·) is generic notation for conditional probability density, χit is the indicator
variable, which is 1 if the firm is active in year t, and 0 otherwise, and β is the model
13See Raknerud (2001) for a more in-depth discussion of firm exit and the MAR-condition. Moﬃtt,
Fitzgerald and Gottschalk (1999) refer to the MAR condition as selection on observables.
17
parameters. Equation (32) says that information about survival in year t should not help
us to predict yit, given the history of the observed variables yi1, ...,yi,t−1.14 A situation
where MAR fails is, say, if the firm anticipated by the end of year t− 1 what its eﬃciency
will be in year t, and chooses to exit if this anticipated eﬃciency is below some thresh-
old. In this case, the value of χit gives information about yit not being contained in
yi1, ...,yi,t−1.
Identification of β based on the pseudo likelihood function is achieved provided (32)
holds and β is identified in the model without attrition. This result holds even if exit
depends on β, as discussed in Raknerud (2001). We use the term likelihood throughout
this paper when, in fact, we consider a pseudo likelihood.
In the presence of self-selection, the MAR assumption is substantially more general
than the assumptions required for consistency of widely-used panel data estimators based
on the (generalized) method of moments15.
6.3 Calculation of the conditional variance ratio
The conditional variance ratio (CV), defined in (22), is the ratio of the variances for the
unobservables, i.e.
CV =
V ar {vi|i ∈MT}
V ar {aiT |i ∈MT} =
tr V ar (vi|i ∈MT )
tr V ar (aiT |i ∈MT ) ,
where the last equality holds if the structural model is valid. This section explains how
Var{vi|i ∈MT} and Var{aiT |i ∈MT} can be estimated.
First note that from (25), aiT = GE1αiT and vi = GE2αiT , for selection matrices
Ej =

δj1Ir 0r×r
0r×r δj2Ir

, j = 1, 2,
where δjk is the Kroencker delta function (which is one if j = k and zero otherwise).
Hence
CV =
tr V ar (αiT |i ∈MT )E2 GGE2
tr V ar (αiT |i ∈MT )E1 GGE1 .
14Notice that the MAR assumption does not exclude firms from having private information that aﬀects
their exit decisions, e.g. information about scrap values. See Raknerud (2001).
15The covariance structure (14) cannot be estimated from sample analogues: If exit is endogenous,
Cov(yit,yis|max(s, t) ≤ Ti) will not in general be given by (14) even if MAR holds. Hence the sample
covariance matrix ceases to provide consistent estimators for the model parameters. See, however, Abowd,
Crepon and Kramarz (2001) who propose a weighted moment estimator that is consistent under the MAR
assumption, provided exit probabilities are known or can be estimated.
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From (27) and the rule of iterated expectation:
V ar{αiT |i ∈MT}
= E{V ar (αiT |i ∈MT ,yi,→T ) |i ∈MT}+ V ar{E (αiT |i ∈MT ,yi,→T ) |i ∈MT}
= E{ViT |T |i ∈MT}+ V ar{aiT |T |i ∈MT},
where the last equality follows from the MAR assumption:
f(αiT |i ∈MT ,yi,→T ) = f(αiT |yi,→T ). (33)
Both E{ViT |T |i ∈ MT} and V ar{aiT |T |i ∈ MT} can be estimated from the cross section
of firms operating in year T , by the empirical mean and variance of ViT |T and aiT |T ,
respectively.
7 Empirical results
This section, which presents our empirical results, is divided into two parts. First, we
argue that our structural model presented in Section 3 accounts well for the empirical
patterns in most of the industries we consider. On the basis of the structural model, we
can construct an estimate of each firm’s eﬃciency every year. The second part of our re-
sults explores these estimates. We show that permanent diﬀerences dominate diﬀerences
generated by cumulated, firm-specific innovations in explaining observed firm heterogene-
ity in all the industries we consider. Finally, we examine the performance of young firms
and how selection systematically eliminates firms with low eﬃciency.
7.1 The validity of our structural model
The results in Tables 2 and 3 largely support our structural model presented in Section
3. Table 2 presents the estimated eigenvalues from the factor decompositions described
in Section 3.2. The second column presents the four estimated eigenvalues, eσ2η,(j), of the
covariance matrix for the idiosyncratic innovations, Ση. In all the industries, the largest
eigenvalue is at least an order of magnitude larger than the second eigenvalue. The same
pattern is present in the third column, presenting the four estimated eigenvalues eσ2v,(j) of
the covariance matrix of the permanent diﬀerences, Σv. The largest eigenvalue is also an
order of magnitude larger than the second largest eigenvalue in all industries for Σv.
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These patterns of eigenvalues show that the persistent diﬀerences in performance can
largely be summarized by the first latent factors ait,(1) and vi,(1), as they account for at
least 90 percent of the variation in ait and vi, respectively. This conclusion is confirmed
by the last columns in Tables 2 and 3, which present a (pseudo-) R2-measure varying
between .97 and .98 in the four-factor model (Table 2), and between .93 and .96 in the
one factor model (Table 3)16. Thus, there is only a marginal increase in R2 when going
from the rank-one to the rank-four model. The excellent fit of the model with only one
latent factor supports our conclusion that a single permanent component and a single
random walk component are largely adequate as a summary of firm performance17.
As pointed out in Section 3.2, our structural model does not only impose a rank
condition on Ση and Σv. These matrices should also have the structure that follows from
θa (see Section 3 and, in particular, (10) and (15)). That is, the structural model in
Section 3 requires that the three first components within each eigenvector should be the
same. Furthermore, the eigenvectors of Ση and Σv should be identical (see (19)).
The estimates for the eigenvector in the one-factor model are presented in Table 3,
with standard deviations in parentheses. A first look at these results indicates that in
four of the six sectors (NACE 29-33), the results for the eigenvector estimates are in
good agreement with the structural model. In two industries, Plastics and Transport
equipment, our estimates show that the labor variable is less responsive to idiosyncratic
innovations than sales and materials, contrary to the prediction by the model in Section
4. The deviation in these two industries may be interpreted as evidence for innovations
that are labor-saving or that the technology is non-homothetic (with, roughly speaking,
some scale economies for labor). Another explanation could be adjustment costs, but
recall that the results in Table 3 refer to responses to persistent changes in eﬃciency18.
Formal χ2-tests of the structural restrictions on the eigenvectors uη and uv are pre-
16Our pseudo R2-measure is
R2 = 1− tr
gV ar(eit)
tr gV ar(yit − edit)
,
where eit = yit − E(vi + ait|yi,→Ti) − eθkki,t−1 − edt (the expectation is evaluated at the estimated
parameters and gV ar(·) denote the sample variance).
17A single factor model is an essential, maintained assumption in most empirical studies of firm per-
formance, including Marschak and Andrews (1944) and Olley and Pakes (1996).
18Griliches and Hausman (1986) report an elasticity of labor to non-transitory changes in output, which
is about the same as the elasticity for materials, while Biørn and Klette (1999) report higher elasticities
for materials.
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sented in Table 4. While all structural restrictions are clearly rejected in the two industries,
Plastics and Transport equipment, the structural hypotheses are largely maintained for
the other four sectors. However, in Machinery the restrictions on uv (and consequently
the hypothesis uη = uv) are rejected, despite the fact that the estimates and standard
deviations in Table 3 appear to be consistent with the null hypothesis. This outcome
should, however, be interpreted in view of the particularly large number of firms in this
sector. As is well known, rejection of any null-hypothesis is only a question of having a
suﬃciently large data set. The power of our test tends to one for the slightest departure
from the null hypothesis19. Machinery is clearly the largest sector (see Table 1), and the
rejection of the structural model in this case is a result of a very large sample size, rather
than evidence that the structural model substantially misrepresents the data.
The eigenvector coeﬃcient in the fourth equation, i.e. the capital accumulation equa-
tion, in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3, is small and suggests that the link between innovations
and investment is, perhaps, surprisingly weak. However, this is consistent with the capital
adjustment model considered in Section 3.1, when the coeﬃcient κa = δα(1−α)(1−ε) is small
(see (8)). Recall that δ is the the depreciation rate of capital, which is typically a small
numner (≈ .03), while α ∈ (0, 1) reflects adjustment costs.
The coeﬃcients of lagged capital, lnKi,t−1, for each of the four equations in our system
(9) are presented in the fourth column in Table 3. The coeﬃcient is slightly less than one
in the capital accumulation equation, consistent with moderately decreasing returns to
scale.
The last column in Table 2 depicts the four eigenvalues from a decomposition of
Σe, the covariance matrix associated with transient shocks. The results show that the
transient shocks are not dominated by a single, common latent factor, in contrast to
the persistent shocks. That is, transient fluctuations are not common across the four
endogenous variables. We notice that the variance generated by the transient variance
component is of the same magnitude as the variance of the innovation component, i.e.
tr (Σe) ≈ tr (Ση) . The transient fluctuations account for mean reversion in the dynamic
process for the observable variables as pointed out in Section 5.2.
Summarizing our results so far, we conclude that our simple, structural model of firm
19See e.g. Leamer (1983) for a discussion of this issue.
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behavior imposes heavy constraints on the data that are largely fulfilled in at least four
of the six industries.
7.2 Permanent diﬀerences dominate
Using our estimated model, we can now examine the origin and evolution of diﬀerences in
eﬃciency across firms. Table 5 presents various measures of the magnitude of permanent
eﬃciency diﬀerences and diﬀerences generated by cumulated innovations within each of
the six industries. Columns 2 and 3 present the variance in permanent diﬀerences and
the variance in cumulated innovations. The ratio of these variances, presented in column
4, shows how many years innovations must be cumulated in order to account for as much
of the heterogeneity as the permanent diﬀerences. These ratios are considerably larger
than the average age (column 5) among the firms established after 1972, suggesting that
the variance of the permanent eﬃciency diﬀerences accounts for the larger fraction of the
non-transient firm heterogeneity in all industries.
These results do not, however, provide a fully satisfactory measure of the importance
of permanent diﬀerences in explaining the observed variation in firm performance, since
they neglect the issue of exit and self-selection. We argued in Section 4 that a better
measure is provided by the conditional variance ratio, which presents the variance ratio
among surviving firms. The conditional variance ratios for each industry in 1996 are pre-
sented in column 6. The pattern from the previous columns remains, i.e. the variance
of the permanent diﬀerences is larger than the variance in the cumulated, idiosyncratic
innovations in all industries. The conditional variance ratios vary from 1.2 in Electrical
instruments (NACE 31) to 2.6 in Medical instruments (NACE 33) and Transport equip-
ment (NACE 35). In all industries, we find that the conditional variance ratio is at least
as large as the unconditional variance ratio. We conclude that in all six industries the
permanent diﬀerences in eﬃciency across firms dominate the diﬀerences in the cumulated
innovations.
7.3 Further results
There is considerable selection that systematically eliminates firms with low eﬃciency.
This can be seen from the ratios in the last column of Table 5. These ratios show that
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the actual variance in eﬃciency among surviving firms, accounting for selection, is con-
siderably smaller than the predicted variance in the absence of selection20.
In all industries there is a strong, negative correlation between the permanent eﬃciency
levels vi and the subsequent innovations, aiT (on average -.40). Our interpretation of this
negative correlation is that a firm with a low permanent eﬃciency level must have a high
growth in eﬃciency in its subsequent years in order to survive and vice versa. That is
to say, selection is based on the firm’s overall eﬃciency, which is the combination of the
permanent eﬃciency levels and the innovations.
Finally, examining permanent diﬀerences in eﬃciency, we find no systematic trend
across cohorts. Our results reveal no vintage-capital eﬀects where more recent cohorts
have higher levels of eﬃciency. However, we do find that younger firms are more innovative
than older firms. That is, there is a negative trend in the mean value of the innovations
during the first five to six years of a firm’s life time. In addition, young firms have more
volatile dynamics than older firms. These results on new firms are consistent with the
findings in several other studies surveyed in Caves (1998).
8 Conclusion
This paper examines the large diﬀerences across firms in terms of supply and demand
for labor, materials and capital. With firm level observations from six manufacturing
industries covering 24 years, we showed that almost 95 percent of these diﬀerences in
supply and factor demands can be accounted for by a single, firm-specific, dynamic factor,
which we label eﬃciency in the light of our structural model. Our structural model of
firm behavior is based on a simple production function and price taking behavior, and it
explicitly accounts for fully optimizing supply and factor demand.
The structural model enables us to investigate the origin and evolution of the diﬀer-
ences in eﬃciency across firms. The empirical results show that permanent diﬀerences in
eﬃciency dominate among the firms established within the 24-year period we consider, as
they exceed diﬀerences in cumulated innovations in eﬃciency by a factor ranging between
20Similar findings have been presented in a number of studies, as surveyed by Foster, Haltiwanger and
Krizan (2001). However, our measurement of eﬃciency diﬀers from the previous studies. The negative
correlation between the probability of exit and a firm’s productivity level has not been striking in previous
studies of Norwegian manufacturing firms. See Møen (1998).
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1.2 and 2.6 across the six high-tech industries.
The most striking and controversial result from our analysis is its implications for
eﬃciency measurement. We argue that size is a better indicator of eﬃciency than labor
productivity, as long as we also account for the fixity of capital. It is well known that
diﬀerences in firm size should reflect diﬀerences in eﬃciency, while the serious problem
we point out with labor productivity as a measure of eﬃciency diﬀerences seems to have
been largely neglected in the literature21.
Our model suggests that diﬀerences in labor productivity should be transitory. This is
largely true in our data, but not completely. An important research task is to explain why
we observe persistent diﬀerences across firms in value added per unit of labor input. Our
simple framework suggests that diﬀerences in eﬃciency and capital are not suﬃcient, and
a satisfactory explanation must incorporate a more elaborated model of labor demand.
Studies of firm level diﬀerences in productivity and labor demand deserve an integrated
treatment.
21See, however, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2000) and Klette and Kortum (2002).
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Appendix A: Some theoretical ideas on firm hetero-
geneity
We decompose the persistent diﬀerences in firm performance into (i) permanent diﬀerences
that are established already when the firm enters an industry, and (ii) diﬀerences that
are generated through subsequent, idiosyncratic innovations that accumulate through the
firms’ life-time22. In this appendix, we briefly review the main ideas in the theoretical lit-
erature emphasizing eﬃciency diﬀerences permanent to the firms and diﬀerences evolving
through innovations that are cumulated, respectively.
The importance of permanent diﬀerences in eﬃciency: Which theoretical models
can explain large permanent diﬀerences across firms that are introduced already when the
firms enter the industry? An old idea is the so-called putty-clay model, emphasizing the
irreversible nature of a firm’s choice of technology. The classical contribution is Johansen
(1959)23. The putty-clay literature emphasizes that choices of technology are embodied
in the capital, which makes adjustment costly as it requires that the existing capital must
be replaced.
Recent case studies of the life cycle of firms suggest that organizational capital can be
as diﬃcult and costly to adjust as physical capital; see e.g. Holbrook, Cohen, Hounshell
and Klepper (2000), Carroll and Hannan (2000), Jovanovic (2001) and Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2001). For instance, Holbrook et al. document the development of four of
the dominating firms in the early history of the semiconductor industry. Their analysis
explains how these firms had a hard time adjusting to the new circumstances as the
industry evolved, and eventually all the firms failed and were closed down.
Large costs associated with adjustment of the organizational capital has also been
a recurrent theme in studies of the productivity eﬀects of new information technology.
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) emphasize that implementing new, IT-based just-in-time
production requires simultaneous and costly adjustments in a number of distinct and
complementary technological and organizational components in order to be productive.
Similar findings have emerged in a number of recent firm level studies examining the
(often small) productivity gains from IT-investments; see the survey by Brynjolfsson and
Hitt (2000).
That re-adjustments of organizational capital are costly and diﬃcult to implement
successfully is not surprising in the light of recent advances in the theory of incentives
in firms and organizations. This research has revealed how firms are operated through a
complicated system of explicit, formal contracts and informal, relational contracts, and
why such a system is costly to adjust and renegotiate; see Gibbons (2000).
Finally, we should mention the study by Jovanovic (1982). His study links diﬀerences
22In his review of models of firm growth and heterogeneity, Sutton (1997) emphasizes essentially the
same distinction, i.e. between models where firm heterogeneity is driven either by ”intrinsic eﬃciency
diﬀerences” or by ”random outcomes emanting from R&D programs”. The distinction between intrinsic
diﬀerences and innovations has also been prominent in labor economics, where the two components are
referred to as heterogeneity and state dependence, respectively. See e.g. Heckman (1991).
23See Førsund and Hjalmarsson (1987), Lambson (1992) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) for further
references to subsequent research.
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in firm productivity to diﬀerences in the skills of the firms’ entrepreneur. The simple
and basic idea is that more eﬃcient entrepreneurs command larger firms. This model of
firm heterogeneity was introduced by Lucas (1978). It was extended by Jovanovic who
introduced entrepreneurial uncertainty about their relative eﬃciency which is gradually
resolved as the entrepreneur learns from the performance of his firm. Jovanovic’s model
has had considerable empirical success, as it provides an explanation for the high degree of
turbulence and high exit rate among young firms. The basic idea that eﬃciency diﬀerences
are permanent characteristics embedded in the firms as they are established, is in line with
the ideas discussed in this section.
The present study does not aim at discriminating among these various theories which
all emphasize the important role of permanent eﬃciency diﬀerences across firms. Instead,
this brief survey is provided to remind the reader why diﬀerences that are introduced
when the firms are born may in principle have a considerable influence on subsequent
firm performance.
Firm growth through cumulated innovations: Another line of research has focused
on diﬀerences in firm performance driven by idiosyncratic and cumulated innovations.
The basic idea is that firm performance is driven by firm specific learning, R&D, and
innovation, involving significant randomness. This line of ideas emphasizes that a firm’s
relative eﬃciency and market share slowly, but gradually changes over time.
Early research on firm heterogeneity was stimulated by Gibrat’s analysis of the skewed
size-distribution of firms, and how such skewed size-distributions can be generated from
independent firm growth processes. These growth processes are characterized, according
to the so-called Gibrat’s law, by firm growth rates that are independent of firm size.
Simon and his co-authors developed this line of research in the 1960s and 1970s, by
exploring firm evolution through formal modelling of the stochastic processes; see Ijiri
and Simon (1977). While this early work paid little attention to optimizing behavior and
interactions between firms, Hopenhayn (1992) presents a related study of an industry
equilibrium generated by interacting and optimizing firms. Firm growth is driven by
exogenous stochastic processes, with exit as an endogenous decision24.
Gibrat’s legacy has recently had a revival, not least due to the work by Sutton (1997,
1998). Sutton shows how persistent diﬀerences in firm size and a concentrated market
structure tend to emerge in models imposing only mild assumptions on the innovation
activities in large versus small firms. His work recognizes the essential role of innovation
and R&D in explaining large and persistent diﬀerences e.g. in firm sizes, but his model
deliberately contains little structure, as he searches for robust patterns which are indepen-
dent of the detailed model structure. A somewhat more structured model of firm growth
through learning and innovation is provided by Ericson and Pakes (1995).
Other recent studies of firm growth emphasizing endogenous learning and innovation,
have imposed tight structures on their models in terms of the role of R&D and the nature
of the innovation process; see Klepper (1996), Klette and Griliches (2000) and Klette and
24Hopenhayn’s model accounts for diﬀerences in initial conditions, as well as idiosyncratic innovations
during the firms’ life cycles. Our empirical framework is in large parts consistent with his model of firm
evolution.
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Kortum (2002). These studies confront stylized facts that have emerged from a large
number of empirical studies of R&D, innovation and firm growth.
The common theme across all these models is that firm growth can be considered as
stochastic processes, with idiosyncratic innovations, and a high degree of persistence.
In the rest of this study we examine the relative, quantitative importance of perma-
nent diﬀerences on the one hand and cumulated innovations on the other, as sources of
persistent firm heterogeneity. Clearly, this is only a first step and subsequent research
will aim at discriminating among the theories within each of these line of research.
Appendix B: Initial conditions and non-stationary
In our econometric model we have assumed that ait is a random walk. However, it might
be desirable to generalize the dynamics of the latent process. For example:
ait = φai,t−1 + ηit (34)
would generalize equation (17), where it was assumed that φ is one. On the other hand,
Blundell and Bond (1999), and Blundell and Bond (2000) consider a dynamic factor
model with a stationary innovation process. Although our assumption greatly simplifies
the interpretation and estimation of our model, and is consistent with Gibrat’s law (which
has received some support in the empirical literature25), the cost is that we might unduly
restrict the dynamics of the yit-process.
However, our econometric procedure does not critically depend on the exact value
of φ, and the main results presented in section 7 would not be seriously aﬀected if φ
is slightly smaller than one (as reported in Blundell and Bond (1999) and Blundell and
Bond (2000)). The reason for this is that the distributions of main interest in this paper
are the conditional distributions of the latent variables given the observed data (see e.g.
the construction of the measure CV in section 6.3). These conditional distributions play
a similar role in our analysis as the posterior distributions in Bayesian statistics. On the
other hand, equation (34) specifies a ”prior” (i.e. unconditional) distribution. Theory and
experience from Bayesian statistics show that inferences based on posterior distributions
are generally robust with respect to moderate alternations of the prior distribution (see
for example Kitagawa, 1996 ).
Appendix C: Capital accumulation
A linear, non-stochastic case: The firm’s capital accumulation solves the functional
equation (see Stokey and Lucas (1989), ch. 5.10):
V (Kt−1) = max
Kt
{F (Kt,Kt−1) + β V (Kt)} (35)
25The empirical literature suggests that Gibrat’s law is valid for large and medium sized firms. The
validity of Gibrat’s law for smaller firms depends on whether the analysis condition on survival. See
Sutton (1997) and Caves (1998) for a discussion and further references.
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where V (Kt−1) is the value function and β = (1 + r)−1 is the discount factor. Assume
that F (Kt, Kt−1) is increasing and strictly concave in Kt, and homogenous of degree one
in (Kt, Kt−1). Furthermore, consider the special case:
F (Kt, Kt−1) = πKt−1 −Kt−1 qc(Kt/Kt−1)
where c(Kt/Kt−1) is continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing and strictly convex, and q is
the price per unit of capital. Let c(1) = δ, where δ corresponds to the rate of depreciation.
The linear homogeneity of F (Kt, Kt−1) implies that V (Kt−1) is linear homogenous inKt−1
(see Stokey and Lucas (1989), ch. 5.10), i.e.
V (Kt−1) = vKt−1. (36)
Using (36), the first order condition is
qc(Kt/Kt−1) = βv (37)
⇒ Kt = Kt−1 g(βv/q)
or
lnKt = lnKt−1 + ln

g

βv
q

The functional form (6) yields:
c(Kt/Kt−1) = δ

1 +
1
δ

Kt
Kt−1
− 1
1/α
, α ∈ (0, 1) . (38)
Given (38), it follows from (37) that g(x) = 1− δ + δ (αx)α/(1−α) and
Kt = Kt−1
+
1− δ + δ

αβv
q
α/(1−α),
(39)
In a stationary state, Kt−1 = Kt. Thus
αβv
q
= 1 (40)
and F (Kt,Kt−1) = (π − qδ)Kt−1. From (35) and (36):
v = π − qδ + βv
⇒ π − qδ
1− β = v =
q
αβ
,
where the last equality follows from (40). Rearranging terms, π = q

r
α + δ

, which
resembles the well-known formula stating that capital’s marginal product, π, equals the
Jorgensonian user cost of capital (i.e. q (r + δ)). With adjustment costs, α < 1, capital’s
marginal product, π, exceeds this user cost of capital, as expected.
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The stochastic case: In the stochastic case, assuming that (At, P t) is Markovian,
with P t = (Pt, qt), the firm’s investment path can be derived from the following Bellman
equation:
V (At, Kt−1, P
t) = max
Kt
q
π(Pt)A
1/(1−ε)
it Kt−1 − qtKt−1c(Kt/Kt−1) + βE

V (At+1, Kt, P
t+1)|Ωt
r
,
(41)
where V (At,Kt−1, P t) is the value function and E [·|Ωt] is the expectation conditional on
the information set Ωt. Assuming the same functional form as above, the main diﬀerence
from the preceeding case is that:
V (At, Kt−1, P
t) = ν(At, P t)Kt,
while (39) is replaced by
Kt = Kt−1
+
1− δ + δ

αβv(At, P t)
q
α/(1−α),
, (42)
where
v(At, P
t) = E

ν(At+1, P t+1)|Ωt

.
After some calculations, we obtain the following functional equation:
ν(At, P t) = π(Pt)A
1/(1−ε)
t + β(1− δ)v(At, P t) +
δ(1− α)
α

αβv(At, P t)
qt
 1
1−α
(43)
A linearization of

αβv(At,P t)
qt
 1
1−α
around αβv(At,P
t)
qt
= 1 (i.e. Kt−1 * Kt), yields
ν(At, P t) * π(Pt)A1/(1−ε)t − qtδ + βE

ν(At+1, P t+1)|Ωt

. (44)
Furthermore, the expression inside the curly brackets in (42) can be approximated as
follows:
ln
+
1 + δ
#
e
α/(1−α) ln

αβv(At,Pt)
q

− 1
$,
* ln

1 +
δα
1− α ln

αβv(At, P t)
q

* δα
1− α ln

αβv(At, P t)
q

Let us consider the solution of (44) in the case where At is a geometric randomwalk, in-
dependent of P t. Assume that (π(Pt), qt) is a martingale. Then E{π(Pt+1)A1/(1−ε)t+1 |Ωt} =
λπ(Pt)A
1/(1−ε)
t and E {qt+1|Ωt} = qt. If a solution to (44) exists,
ν(At, P t) =
π(Pt)A
1/(1−ε)
t
1− λβ −
δqt
1− β
v(At, P
t) =
λπ(Pt)A
1/(1−ε)
t
1− λβ −
δqt
1− β .
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Then (42) can be restated as
lnKt − lnKt−1 = κt +
δα
(1− α)(1− ε) ln (At) + error,
where
κt =
δα
1− α ln

rαβλπ(Pt)
qt (r + αβδ)

.
By a Taylor expansion, the error term can be written:
error =
δα
(1− α)
1
1 + rαβδ
(x− 1) +O

(x− 1)2

where x ≡ αβv(At, P t)/qt. The error term is small relative to the leading term when
Kt−1 * Kt (i.e. x * 1) and r/ (αβδ) is large. The capital accumulation equation is then
approximately linear in lnAt in the neighborhood of ”steady state” when adjustment
costs are large and depreciation is slow.
Appendix D: NACE sector codes
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and appa-
ratus
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and
clocks
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment
Appendix E: Computational issues
The Kalman filter and -smoother: We shall now use the state space representation
(25)-(26) to derive the conditional moments (27) by means of the Kalman-filter and -
smoother. We first define
Qit = V ar{ωit}
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(see (26)). By modifying the exposition in Fahrmeir and Tutz (1994), p. 264, the filtering
recursions can be described by the following algorithm:
Kalman filtering:
For i = 1, ...,N :
aτ i−1|τ i−1 = 02r
Vτ i−1|τ i−1 = 02r×2r
do for t = τ i, ..., Ti:
ait|t−1 = Fitai,t−1|t−1
Vit|t−1 = FitVi,t−1|t−1Fit +Qit
Zit = yit − dt − γk lnKi,t−1
Kit = Vit|t−1G[GVit|t−1G +Σe]−1
ait|t = ait|t−1 +Kit(Zit −Gait|t−1)
Vit|t = Vit|t−1 −KitGVit|t−1, (45)
The conditional expectations ait|Ti and variances Vit |Ti are obtained in subsequent back-
ward smoothing recursions (see Fahrmeir and Tutz (1994), p. 265):
Kalman smoothing:
For i = 1, ..., N :
do for t = Ti, ...., τ i + 1:
ai,t−1|Ti = ai,t−1|t−1 +Bit(ait|Ti − ait|t−1)
Vi,t−1|Ti = Vi,t−1|t−1 +Bit(Vit|Ti −Vit|t−1)Bit, (46)
where
Bit = Vi,t−1|t−1FitV
−1
it|t−1.
Derivatives of the log-likelihood function: We shall now show how to obtain ana-
lytic derivatives of the log-likelihood function using the relation:
∂L(β)
∂β

β=β
=
∂M(β|β)
∂β

β=β
(see (31)).We first need an expression for
M(β|β) = −1
2
N[
i=1
Ti[
t=τ i
( ln |Σe| +
E

(yit − [Γη Γv]αit − dit − γk lnKi,t−1)
 Σ−1e (yit − [Γη Γv]αit − dit − γk lnKi,t−1) |yi,→Ti ;β

,
(47)
where the expectation is evaluated at the parameter value β. Standard calculations and
(27) yield:
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M(β|β) = −1
2
N[
i=1
Ti[
t=τ i
( ln |Σe|
+ tr Σ−1e

yit − [Γη Γv]ait|Ti − dt − γk lnKi,t−1
 
yit − [Γη Γv]ait|Ti − dt − γk lnKi,t−1

+tr Σ−1e [Γη Γv]Vit|Ti[Γη Γv]
 .
In practice, the optimization is performed with respect to the Cholseky factors of Σe to
ensure positive definiteness:
Σe = ΓeΓe,
where Γe is lower triangular. Hence, in the implementation of the optimization algorithm
β = (Γη,Γv,Γe,γk,d). Analytic expressions for the derivatives of M(β|β) with respect
to the components of β are easily available (see Lutkepohl (1996)).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Sector (NACE) #Firms total/1996 Mean output∗ Median output Lab.prod∗
Plastics (25) 242/99 1.77 (2.6) .74 1.39 (.82)
Machinery (29) 1410/514 1.71 (6.3) .40 1.37 (.92)
Electrical inst. (31) 377/162 3.30 (11.8) .61 1.18 (.81)
Radio/TV eq (32) 249/86 4.57 (9.9) .76 1.04 (.64)
Medical inst. (33) 129/73 2.08 (3.9) .75 1.51 (.81)
Transp. eq. (35) 818/286 7.03 (23.7) .99 1.30 (.68)
∗ Standard errors in parentheses. All numbers are in logs.
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Table 2: Estimates of eigenvalues in model with four latent factors
Eigenvalues of Ση Eigenvalues of Σv Eigenvalues of Σe Pseudo
Sector (NACE) (Idiosyncratic innov.) (Intrinsic diﬀerences) (Noise)
Plastics (25) (.18, .02, .00, .00) (3.38, .26, .01, .00) (.19, .08, .04, .02) 0.97
Machinery (29) (.24, .02, .00, .00) (2.00, .20, .00, .00) (.17, .07, .04, .02) 0.98
Electrical inst.(31) (.24, .01, .00, .00) (2.17, .23, .01, .00) (.15, .07, .02, .02) 0.98
Radio/TV eq.(32) (.35, .03, .00, .00) (3.27, .22, .00, .00) (.27, .07, .04, .02) 0.97
Medical inst. (33) (.28, .02, .00, .00) (4.07, .15, .01, .00) (.15, .07, .02, .01) 0.97
Transp. eq. (35) (.32, .03, .00, .00) (5.96, .38, .01, .00) (.20, .10, .04, .03) 0.98
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Table 3: Estimates of eigenvectors and capital coeﬃcients in model with one
latent factor.
Sector (NACE) Idiosyn. inn. Intrinsic dif. Capital coef. Pseudo R2
Estim. (st.dev.) Estim. (st.dev.) Estim. (st.dev.)
Plastics (25)
.62 (.02)
.73 (.04)
.28 (.12)
.01 (.03)
.59 (.03)
.52 (.10)
.60 (.10)
.02 (.02)
.45 (.17)
.56 (.22)
.32 (.14)
.98 (.02)
0.94
Machinery (29)
.57(.01)
.59 (.01)
.56 (.02)
.00 (.01)
.55 (.01)
.56 (.03)
.61 (.04)
.01 (.01)
.58 (.05)
.62 (.06)
.50 (.05)
.99 (.01)
0.93
Electrical Inst. (31)
.58(.03)
.60 (.04)
.54 (.09)
.04 (.02)
.60(.04)
.60 (.05)
.52 (.10)
.01 (.02)
.65 (.07)
.65 (.08)
.64 (.07)
.99 (.01)
0.96
Radio/TV eq.(32)
.58(.01)
.61 (.03)
.52 (.05)
.00 (.02)
.58(.02)
.58 (.04)
.56 (.05)
.03 (.03)
.44(.11)
.46 (.12)
.43 (.09)
.97 (.03)
0.94
Medical Inst. (33)
.58(.03)
.61 (.06)
.52 (.07)
.03 (.05)
.57(.01)
.58 (.03)
.56 (.03)
.01 (.01)
.31(.15)
.35 (.19)
.29 (.12)
.99 (.04)
0.94
Transp. Eq. (35)
.58(.01)
.76 (.02)
.29 (.05)
.01 (.01)
.58(.03)
.61 (.06)
.52 (.07)
.03 (.05)
.44(.05)
.52 (.06)
.38 (.03)
.97 (.01)
0.95
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Table 4: Testing structural restrictions on eigenvectors
Sector (NACE) Restrictions uη Restrictions uv Joint restictions
χ2 d.f. P-value χ2 d.f. P-value χ2 d.f. P-value
Plastics (25) 23.07 2 .00 5.2 2 .07 34.43 5 .00
Machinery (29) 3.20 2 .20 30.21 2 .00 44.93 5 .00
Electrical Inst. (31) .69 2 .70 1.78 2 .41 4.15 5 .52
Radio/TV eq.(32) 5.05 2 .08 .23 2 .89 8.93 5 .11
Medical Inst. (33) 1.00 2 .60 .06 2 .96 2.52 5 .77
Transp. Eq. (35) 105.21 2 .00 18.2 2 .00 131.5 5 .00
Table 5: Measures of the origins of firm heterogeneity. The variances of cumulative
innovations and intrinsic diﬀerences, their ratio, average firm age, conditional variance
measure (CV), and actual variance versus predicted variance in the absence of selection .
Sector (NACE) σ2η σ2v T ∗ =
σ2v
σ2η
Avg. age tr V ar(vi|i∈MT )
tr V ar(ait|i∈MT )
V ar(vi+aiT |i∈MT )
σ2v+T¯ σ2η
Plastics (25) 0.16 2.27 14.2 7.1 2.3 .38
Machinery (29) 0.20 1.66 8.3 6.9 1.7 .46
Electrical inst. (31) 0.20 1.80 9.0 7.2 1.2 .27
Radio/TV eq.(32) 0.32 3.20 10.0 8.5 2.0 .41
Medical inst. (33) 0.23 3.46 15.0 6.7 2.6 .43
Transp. eq. (35) 0.24 4.25 17.7 8.5 2.6 .71
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Figure 1: Diﬀerences in log sales as a function of firm age. Circles indicate the
means and whiskers show the standard errors.
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Figure 2: The correlation between relative performance in a firm’s first year
and in its subsequent years. The circles correspond to the correlation coeﬃcents for
(log) sales while the triangles refer to (log) labor productivity.
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Figure 3: Diﬀerences in log labor productivity as a function of firm age. Circles
indicate the means and whiskers show the standard errors.
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